![]() When asked to fire on demonstrators, its soldiers often declined and defected to the resistance. ![]() This did not work out, for desertions seriously weakened the ill-trained and ill-motivated Afghan Army. The war ebbed and flowed through the years, but it was increased Western support of the Afghans-including introduction of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapons such as the SA-7 and the Stinger-that forced the Red Army to pack up and leave.Īt the onset of the conflict, the Soviets expected the army of the Kabul regime to make large-scale sweeps against resistance forces, with the Soviets supplementing the domestic efforts. On the third side was the fractious Afghan resistance, united only in its allegiance to Islam and its hatred of any imposed outside influence.Įstimates of the strength of the Afghan resistance ranged from 90,000 up to 700,000 in the 10 years of the war, but of these only a small portion was effective in modern guerrilla war or was even in the field at any time. The Afghan Army suffered from internal divisions and dislike of the invaders, who were also their main patrons. A second side centered on the armed forces of the Soviet-backed Kabul regime. One side comprised Soviet conventional forces, which were strong, well-equipped, and well-trained-but for a war in Europe, not Afghanistan. Over the next 10 years, a curious, three-sided conflict unfolded in Afghanistan. It was, of course, a miscalculation of historic proportion. Russia’s leaders hoped that these measures and a potent Soviet occupation force would guarantee peace on the USSR’s highly sensitive southern border. The new regime immediately launched a pro-Muslim charm offensive and moved to blame all previous problems on the former rulers. Other units crossed the border and fanned out to occupy air bases and cities. In Amin’s place, the Soviets installed another puppet, Babrak Karmal, as the new head of government. 27, an elite Soviet Spetsnaz unit raided the president’s Darulaman Palace with orders to kill Amin and every living soul with him. The Kremlin, however, had not played its final card. Once in Kabul, Soviet forces moved out swiftly, seizing key targets, and on Dec. In mid-December, a well-timed and well-executed military airlift, using some 280 aircraft, transported crack, combat-ready Soviet troops to Kabul. These units moved to cover the vital Salang Pass, the invasion route of the Soviet Red Army’s 360th and 375th Motor Rifle Divisions. Airborne battalions arrived at Bagram Air Base that December. The Red Army invasion force secretly began mobilizing in October 1979.
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